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Resumo
Alterações Climáticas e a Política de Segurança da 
UE: um Desafio não Alcançado
A Cimeira europeia de Dezembro 2013 deu à União 
Europeia um mandato para uma nova estratégia 
de segurança. As alterações climáticas têm desem-
penhado um papel cada vez mais importante nos 
debates sobre segurança europeia. A União tem 
sido uma das organizações a melhor identificar 
as alterações climáticas como um “multiplicador 
de ameaça” e a desenvolver todo um conjunto de 
iniciativas políticas, destinadas a relacionar fatores 
aliados às alterações climáticas com as políticas ex-
ternas e de segurança.
A UE tem pressionado para um ambicioso acordo 
internacional sobre clima até 2015 pelo que importa 
considerar a relação entre duas agendas: a da polí-
tica externa e da segurança. O autor examina pro-
blemas resultantes da fragmentação de responsabi-
lidades entre vários atores institucionais europeus 
aos quais falta um enfoque sobre questões climáti-
cas. O artigo explora ainda a relação entre altera-
ções climáticas e políticas de emigração da UE; a 
relação entre clima, segurança energética e política 
de defesa e a dimensão geoeconómica das respos-
tas políticas da União. Conclui com uma reflexão 
sobre se o fenómeno das alterações climáticas terá 
um efeito positivo sobre a cooperação europeia, em 
particular no domínio da gestão de crises com ori-
gem climática ou se ao invés incentivará os Estados 
a uma postura de isolamento.
Abstract
The EU defense summit, in December 2013, gave the 
Union a mandate to draw up a new security strategy. 
Climate change plays an increasingly prominent part on 
debates on the European security. The EU was one of the 
first organizations to identify climate change as a “threat 
multiplier” and to gather a considerable collection of po-
licy initiatives, designed to mainstream climate related 
factors within its foreign and security policies.
The EU is also pushing for an ambitious post-2015 in-
ternational climate accord. Against this background, it 
is an important moment to consider the link between two 
policy tracks – the security and climate change agendas. 
The author examines problems that result from frag-
mented responsibilities, among different European ins-
titutional players, which lack a specific focus on climate 
change. Further, the article explores the link between cli-
mate change and EU migration policies, the connection 
between the impact of climate change, energy security 
and defence policy, and the geo-economic dimension of 
EU policy responses. It concludes with a reflection on 
whether climate change will impact positively on Eu-
ropean cooperation, in particular in the framework of 






Climate Change and EU Security Policy: an Unmet Challenge
The European Union (EU) is committed to upgrading its security policy and better 
identifying the long-term challenges to its strategic interests. The December 2013 
EU defense summit gave the Union’s diplomatic body (the external action servi-
ce, EAS) a mandate to draw up a new security strategy. Climate change plays an 
increasingly prominent part in these European security debates. The EU was one 
of the first organizations to identify climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’. It has 
gradually put in place an impressive collection of policy initiatives designed to 
mainstream climate related factors within its foreign and security policies.
In addition to these developments in security policy, changes are afoot in the EU’s 
climate and energy policies. On 22 January the European Commission published its 
proposed energy policy guidelines up to 2030. These focused attention on a single, 
binding 40 per cent target for carbon emission reductions. The EU is also pushing 
for an ambitious post-2015 international climate accord. Against this background, 
it is an important moment at which to consider the link between these two policy 
tracks – the security and the climate change agendas.  
Much has been written on the way in which climate change is likely to aggrava-
te geo-strategic threats. While analysts disagree on how serious such effects will 
be, there is a growing consensus that so-called ‘climate security’ needs to be taken 
more seriously. Many predict a worrying cluster of climate-induced effects: increa-
sed conflict and state fragility; mass migrations; tense competition and struggles 
for scarce resources; a trend toward nervous self-help introspection and even mili-
tarization on the part of major powers; a closing down of the international trading 
system; and more complex risk management in strategic planning. Many believe 
that climate change is set to become a more serious security challenge than any 
other issue. 
This paper examines the EU’s record in designing better climate security policies. It 
asks what substance lies behind the EU’s rhetoric and plethora of policy documents 
on this issue. It argues that the EU has made much progress in beginning to address 
the broader security ramifications of climate change, but that the Union needs to do 
more to develop an effective set of policy instruments that matches the magnitude 
of the likely threats ahead. 
To this end, the paper suggests what the EU could and should be doing to respond 
to and prepare for climate-induced geopolitical instability. It argues that good cli-
mate security requires several components. European militaries must build on their 
incipient engagement with climate change to prepare for its broader geopolitical 
consequences: the securitization of climate change should not entail a narrow mili-
tarization. The EU must introduce more climate-specificity into its conflict prevent 
initiatives. It must do more to ensure that the read-over from its internal energy po-
licies is consistent with its external geostrategic aims. And it needs a much clearer 
and systematic approach to the geo-economics of climate change.
Nação e Defesa 102
Richard Youngs
Notwithstanding the undoubted progress made, there is a risk that short-term cri-
ses are crowding climate security from the EU’s highest foreign policy priorities. 
While this may be understandable, the Union must remember that climate security 
is set to become one of the defining strategic issues in future years and must be kept 
at the forefront of security strategy upgrades. 
New Commitments
Climate change has begun to have an impact on the general definition of European 
security policy. Energy security is no longer conceived purely in terms of relations 
with key oil and gas producers. 
In 2008 the then foreign policy high representative, Javier Solana, published a joint 
paper with the European Commission on ‘Climate change and international securi-
ty’. This recognised climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ that needed to be placed 
at the heart of EU security policy. It warned that the risks were not just humani-
tarian but political and strategic, affecting the EU’s own interests (Council of the 
European Union, 2008).
In the 2008 revision of the European Security Strategy, climate change was identi-
fied as a core strategic and not merely environmental challenge (European Union, 
2008).  In July 2011 the EU agreed new council conclusions on ‘climate diploma-
cy’ (Council Secretariat, 2011). This promised identifiable action on the security 
strand of EU policy. In September 2011, the Commission proposed a more strate-
gic approach to its international energy policies. The new strategy reinforced the 
commitment to linking climate change policies to the EU’s core security policies 
(European Commission, 2011a). In July 2012 the External Action Service released 
a new strategy document on the Arctic. In this, the EU committed to strengthe-
ning its security role in the Arctic region (External Acton Service, 2012: 11). 
The EU’s Green Diplomacy Network (GDN) was upgraded by the EAS in 2012, 
to help mainstream foreign policy questions within climate change deliberations. 
Regular training for officials has been introduced on the security impacts of climate 
change and a plethora of studies has been commissioned. 
European governments have agreed to ring-fence 20 per cent of the 2014-2019 EU 
budget for climate questions across all policy areas; this will include external rela-
tions resources being deployed far more meaningfully for the geopolitical dimen-
sions of climate change (Council Secretariat, 2013: 6). 
At the end of June 2013 the foreign affairs council adopted conclusions on cli-
mate diplomacy and security, together with a new External Action Service re-
flection paper. These commit ministers to an annual review of progress made in 
injecting foreign and security policy parameters into climate change strategies. 
The reflection paper claims that the EU is now much more ‘joined-up’ in having 
its mainstream diplomacy dovetail with climate objectives (Council of the Euro-
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pean Union, 2013; External Action Service, 2013). Another ministerial in July 2013 
focused on water challenges, with the aim of enhancing EU engagement in the 
Mekong, Nile and other worsening water-related tensions (Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2013a). 
The EU has increasingly prioritized climate security in its dialogues with the US, 
China, Brazil and South Africa, and at a regional level with Central Asia and the 
Maghreb. European leaders made a link between climate change and the Novem-
ber 2013 typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. The EU has pressed a new UN discus-
sion on climate security in 2014.  
The German foreign ministry has placed ‘climate and security’ as a priority ‘new 
area of activity.’ (Auswärtiges Amt, n.d.). The German minister of state called for 
‘climate security to be a core topic around which broader international alliances are 
constructed (Pieper, 2012: 20). The Auswärtiges Amt began increasing its climate 
change capacity from 2010. Funds for additional posts and a series of practical re-
gional initiates have been forthcoming. 
The UK’s 2008 national security strategy posited a link between climate change 
and security and claimed that: ‘Climate change is potentially the greatest challen-
ge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security.’ (HM Go-
vernment, 2008: 18; 27). In 2010 William Hague suggested that: ‘Climate change 
is perhaps the twenty-first century’s biggest foreign policy challenge.’’ (Hague, 
2010). At the end of 2011 the UK government committed itself to producing a 
more political set of climate risk assessments. It pointed to the government’s at-
tempt to assess how climate change threatened not only direct physical effects but 
would bring ‘new interests into the geopolitical calculations of states, for which 
current global governance structures were not designed’ (Government Office for 
Science, 2011: 9; 40). 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain have all introduced similar climate 
security strategies and sponsored a range of dialogue and seminars on this issue.
The French government published an extensive climate strategy in 2011 that also 
broadened out the geostrategic focus of climate action (Gouvernement de la France, 
2011). European governments are united in seeking to embed a climate security 
remit in the United Nations Security Council, against opposition from most deve-
loping states.  
Lacking Specificity
This plethora of commitments, at member state and EU level, represents genuine 
and significant progress. Climate security is now firmly on the EU agenda. Howe-
ver, practical follow-through has been relatively limited, in many cases. 
While statements, studies and conferences have been plentiful, their impact on ac-
tual European policies remains less than far-reaching. The EU has begun to tackle 
Nação e Defesa 104
Richard Youngs
select elements of climate security, such as preparing for climate-related humani-
tarian relief operations. But has yet to put in place a full-spectrum climate foreign 
policy. 
If anything, the rate of policy innovation has slowed, as since 2011 the EU has been 
preoccupied with other pressing priorities; many climate security strategies were 
introduced in the years up to 2010-2011 only for their follow-up momentum to fal-
ter. The EU has found itself confronted with so many more immediately urgent 
challenges – from the economic crisis to the Arab spring – that in practice the issue 
of climate security has slipped down its list of priorities.
Critics lament that the profound changes that will occur to global political geogra-
phy are nowhere near being integrated into strategic planning (Pascal, 2009). High 
Representative Catherine Ashton has not given a single speech dedicated specifi-
cally to the issue. Commitments are still phrased mainly in terms of ‘developing 
a narrative, ‘awareness-raising’ and ‘engaging’ with business, civil society, other 
powers and international organisations – that is, they are largely about the EU’s 
own institutional preparedness and couched less in terms of commitments to tan-
gible policy output (Council of the European Union, 2013: 5).
Responsibilities for foreign and security policy, energy security and climate chan-
ge are split in confusing fashion amongst a large number of institutional players. 
None of these departments are tasked unequivocally with leading on the geopoli-
tical impact of climate change (European Parliament, 2013: 83). The same is true at 
the national level too: environment ministries may have adopted the discourse of 
‘geopolitical impact’ but they have fought hard to keep the security community at 
arms-length (Mabey, 2010: 6).
Notwithstanding a small number of more developed ‘climate dialogues’, there is 
little evidence that climate security has become a significant factor conditioning 
the shape of EU global alliances and strategies for effective multilateralism. Critics 
charge the UK and other European states with failing to adjust their international 
alliances in accordance with how climate change is likely to rebalance global power 
(Depledge, 2012: 82). 
Many policy-makers claim that the EU’s best contribution to global climate se-
curity comes from its own internal commitments. EU member states have made 
progress towards the well-known set of targets on emissions reductions, re-
newables and energy efficiency (the so-called ‘20/20/20 by 2020’ commitments). 
Some critics argue that emissions reductions are mainly a result of the reces-
sion, not structural change; a recession that has also eaten into research spen-
ding on renewables. Nevertheless, the EU is still in relative terms a strong 
performer in terms of all these indicators. Policy-makers make a read-over 
from this to the foreign policy aspects of climate and energy policy. They are 
fond of exhorting that changing light bulbs and funding loft insulation are the 
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best contributions to climate-sensitive foreign policy. And external policy takes 
the form of the EU seeking to export its internal energy regulations to other coun-
tries. 
The EU’s mainstream climate change policies – emissions targets, renewable deve-
lopment – do have an impact on climate security at a global level. But the EU tends 
rather uncritically to presume that the extension of its own rules and templates 
axiomatically constitutes a security policy beyond its borders. This is an unduly 
simplistic assumption, which also exaggerates the strength of core, internal EU cli-
mate change commitments. 
In some senses, the expansion outwards of the EU’s highly regulatory approach 
constrains – more than it empowers - the geo-political dimensions of climate securi-
ty policy. Security deliberation tends to get crowded out by a mindset of regulatory 
export. Senior members of the EP’s foreign affairs committee have admonished the 
Commission’s ‘introverted’ focus on replicating internal market rules and conse-
quent blindness to the international geopolitical dimensions of climate and energy 
(European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012).
Moreover, much policy-making effort remains focused on quite traditional parame-
ters of energy security.  Indeed, in some ways the focus now attached to the ‘switch 
to gas’ has begun to cut across climate security policies. It is true that environ-
mental concerns are holding back shale development in Europe far more than they 
have done in the United States. Yet, the advent of non-conventional sources of oil 
and gas has once more tipped energy security debates back to a focus on access to 
hydrocarbons. In short, despite much rhetoric to the contrary, in practice European 
governments still conceive energy-related security as being overwhelmingly about 
guaranteeing oil and, increasingly, unconventional gas supplies far ore than it is a 
question of pre-empting climate-induced instability.
Climate-Induced Fragility
An increasing area of concern is how climate change affects EU strategies in the 
area of conflict prevention and resolution. The stated priority has been more assi-
duously to address underlying governance pathologies in fragile and developing 
states, on the grounds that climate stresses render containment-based strategies to 
conflict even more clearly insufficient. Yet responses to ‘climate conflict’ remain un-
derwhelming. European policy-makers agree that climate change is likely to aug-
ment the risk of civil conflict in resource-stressed societies. But it has not prompted 
any significant upgrade in EU conflict prevention efforts. Nor has it led to qualitati-
vely different approaches to conflict that discernibly build from climate-related risk 
indicators. European governments have in practice done relatively little to integra-
tion climate change factors into their conflict prevention policies as these operate on 
the ground in specific conflict theatres. 
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One report notes that little has been done to move forward with the aim of de-
vising an ‘environmental peacekeeping’ strategy (Swiss Peace, 2011: 68).  When 
EU leaders released a ten-year update of the EU’s so-called Gothenburg conflict 
prevention programme in 2011 this made no mention of any climate related factors 
(European Council, 2011).  
Some initiatives funded by the Commission-managed Instrument for Stability (IfS) 
have been related to climate security. These include projects in the Horn of Africa 
to respond to tensions caused by drought and food price increases; and in Bangla-
desh, building institutions to respond better to flooding (European Commission, 
2012).1 In 2011 a modest 1.5 million euros of the IfS total spend was allocated for 
‘natural resources and conflict’.2 Officials insist that the post-2014 IfS is set to place 
more stress on climate-driven conflict. In 2013 the EU advanced with its 150 million 
euro Agadir Sahel programmes to strengthen resilience on climate change, directly 
linked to security interventions in Mali. 
The EU has sought to enhance its early warning systems. The European Commis-
sion Crisis Room, Regional Crisis Response Planning Officers, the Situation Centre, 
a European Rapid Alert System, the External Action Service conflict unit and the 
EU Military Staff all have a role in early warning. However, early warning respon-
sibilities specifically linked to climate change are still not clear or easily operational. 
And significantly, no climate change-related factors are incorporated into the way 
that potential crises are monitored. The CIA created a unit for forward-warning 
climate crises; nothing so systematic has been created in European states. 
The focus has been on ‘disaster response’ much more than on ‘disaster prepared-
ness’. The EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to conflict that was developed during 
2013 did not have an apparent operational consequences related to climate-induced 
instability. The EAS has coordinated joint sessions with African states and China 
on joint climate challenges. However, tangible operational change is hard to detect. 
The British government’s conflict Watchlist and Annual Horizon Scan does work 
with climate related indicators. UK conflict strategy lists climate triggers as one of 
the factors prompting effort to upgrade and fine-tune conflict prevention efforts (HM 
DFID: 2011). The Danish government has created a new Peace and Stabilisation Fund 
which will make new funds available for climate security projects (ECC Platform, 
n.d.). The German MFA has explored the notion of track II initiatives to reflect on the 
interests of the groups most affected by climate change (German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2011). Germany now explicitly advocates ‘conflict-sensitive adaptation prac-
tices’, in particular linking track one and two approaches and using climate funds for 
governance challenges in fragile regions (German Federal Foreign Office, 2012: 17). 
1  Plus for details on programmes, the four volumes of the accompanying Staff Working Document.
2  See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/c_2011_4451_en.pdf
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There is a widespread consensus among policy makers that the changes flowing 
from such formal initiatives are no more than embryonic. A 2012 independent as-
sessment of the UK’s conflict pool concluded that the basic policy had not chan-
ged (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2012). A similar stasis is evident 
elsewhere too. While Spanish ministers have made increasingly bold statements 
acknowledging the climate-conflict link (Ministerio de Defensa de España, 2011), 
the link between the defence minister and the Secretary of State for Climate Change 
is relatively weak. Insiders acknowledge that this means that the UME’s inception 
has not led to any change in the broader gamut of Spanish conflict prevention po-
licies. 
NGOs criticise European governments and the EU collectively for failing to in-
corporate the underlying drivers of instability into more climate-sensitive conflict 
prevention policies. There is still no granular means of assessing the risk of climate
-induced conflict and instability. Governments have struggled to incorporate clima-
te-specific elements into their traditional conflict prevention programmes because 
they admit that more climate specialists would need to engage with the conflict 
agenda. 
The EU has developed initiatives to improve poor communities’ access to energy. 
Policy-makers argue that this lends a distinctive dimension to conflict prevention 
and one that is centred more on mutual human security concerns rather than pu-
rely traditional state interests. Climate commissioner Connie Hedegaard insists 
that a focus on access to energy in ODA is and must continue to be the leading edge 
of the EU’s linking of security and climate change policy (Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2011). A new Commission communication in March 2013 
promised to merge development and climate change issues into a single seamless 
anti-poverty policy (European Commission, 2013). The EU’s entry point into clima-
te security has been primarily through the mainstreaming of adaptation initiatives 
into holistic development aid programmes (Brito, 2012). 
Some observers, however, doubt that increases in European climate financing have 
a strong or direct relevance to climate security. Critics say the EU’s approach almost 
dampens the security logic through a discourse implying that the issue is little more 
than a need for more sustainable development. Most development agencies still 
resist their aid being used for anything with security overtones. Donors still need 
fully to incorporate ‘conflict-sensitivity’ into their adaptation funding. Governmen-
ts conceive adaptation too narrowly as a matter of protective, physical infrastructu-
re or renewable projects; in fact, it is a matter of improving governance to enhance 
resilience to climate stresses (Smith, 2009: 4, 8, 11, 22). 
Critics also worry that the EU risks pursuing an approach to resource-conflict that 
actually renders such conflict more likely in the long-term (Citpax, 2011: 11). Com-
mercial EU policies are still oriented more to ‘extracting’ energy resources for Eu-
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ropean use.  This reflects a fundamental and unresolved tension at the heart of 
European policies. Is security primarily a matter of bringing scarce energy resour-
ces into Europe? Or is it a question of ensuring that the latter are distributed, both 
internationally and within locally-fragile contexts, in the kind of equitable fashion 
that reduces the likelihood of conflict? So far, policy outcomes suggest that the EU 
has sought to straddle these two approaches without a clear prioritisation or ack-
nowledgement of the trade-offs involved. 
Migration: Denial?
Rhetorically, European ministers repudiate the ‘fortress Europe’ approach to ma-
naging climate migration. The stated preference is for a more subtle approach ba-
sed on cooperation with third countries aimed at ‘managing’ the impact of climate 
change on migratory flows. 
In practice, European policy on climate and migration remains ambivalent. It is 
well-known that EU member states have gradually tightened rules on migration 
into Europe. The influence of climate-induced migration in explaining these policy 
trends has been negligible. Indeed, it is striking how absent climate concerns have 
been from the evolution of European migration policies. The European Parliament 
has criticised the EU institutions for failing to devise contingency plans for an in-
crease in climate-driven migration (Citpax, 2011: 9). 
The EU still has no mapping of what migration flows are likely from different parts 
of the world as a result of climate change. It lags behind the US in preparing for cli-
mate migration. US government bodies have begun running exercises focusing on 
the impact of displacements within other regions. European organisations have still 
not included migration in their climate risk mappings because of the uncertainties 
over its scale and nature; and this issue is still not part of inter-regional negotia-
tions, say, between the EU and African Union (Werz, 2012). 
The so-called Stockholm programme agreed in 2009 as the EU’s main strategy for 
internal security calls for greater focus on climate change as a driver of security
-relevant migratory flows. The Commission’s 180 million euro 2011-2013 strategy 
paper that guides funds under its thematic programme for ‘Cooperation with third 
countries in the areas of migration and asylum’ explicitly commits to working more 
on the nexus between climate change and migration (European Commission, n. d.: 
27-28). 
In April 2013 the EU published a new staff working document on climate change 
and migration. Significantly, this was prepared by the development and coopera-
tion agency, DevCo, rather than DG Home. In line with most recent research, it 
downplays the likelihood of mass flows into Europe itself resulting directly from 
climate stress in developing states. Rather it places most stress on movements wi-
thin developing countries themselves and the problem of internally displaced peo-
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ple. The focus is on development-related resilience-building. It states that the core 
policy aim should be to improve development opportunities to allow people to stay 
put in local communities as resources became scarcer. At the same time, the Com-
mission acknowledges that more needs to be done positively to assist relocation 
where this would help access to resources. It admits that so far no more than a few 
limited projects have been funded to give substance to this more positive approach 
and that recipients’ country strategy papers still include no mention of the climate-
migration link that would serve as a basis for practical aid programming decisions 
(European Commission, 2013a: 22, 28-29, 34). 
European diplomats argue that the focus needs to be on intra-regional flows not 
flows into Europe. They tend to argue that climate migration may be of more in-
direct than direct concern to Europe: displacements from one developing state to 
another, or from one region to another within the same state, may trigger conflict 
and instability that then effect Western interests. Several new cooperation program-
mes in consequence focus on this dimension of climate migration – although funds 
remain limited compared to those pumped into standard border controls. 
EU member states have not supported the idea of including a new category of ‘cli-
mate refugee’, as many developing countries urge. Governments argue that if climate 
migrants were given the status of refugees this could prejudice the reception and 
resources given to those fleeing really acute political violence as a matter of absolute 
urgency. The aim is more modestly to get climate factors incorporated into interna-
tional rules on internally displaced persons. DG Home has suggested a status of ‘per-
manently forced migration’ as a new category to get around the refugee problem. The 
April 2013 working document argues there is no need for ‘refugee-type protection’ 
specifically on climate-related grounds ((European Commission, 2013a: 18).
Militaries’ Role
European militaries have increasingly bought into the climate security agenda, des-
pite it not constituting a traditional form of threat. The UK in particular has incor-
porated climate planning into its defence policy and introduced a more systematic 
coverage of climate change into its military staff colleges; it also created the post 
of climate and energy security envoy (HM Ministry of Defence, 2012). Spain has 
created a Military Emergency Unit to respond to climate disasters. Defence strate-
gies in Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic all mention climate 
security, albeit in somewhat low profile and unspecific fashion. 
European defence ministries are now fully engaged on the question of how climate 
change is likely to impose new requirements on their own operations. They are still 
in the process of taking the next step to envisioning how climate change could act 
as a powerful modifier of geopolitics and thus impinge upon the broader contours 
of defence policy (Brock, 2012).
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EU planners have begun to assess climate factors as part of conflict management 
scenario-building, as well as tighter coordination with the EU’s Civil Protection 
Mechanism (Ducrotté, 2012: 6). However, while European militaries have begun 
to take climate security seriously, there is little evidence of preparedness for armed 
interventions being carried out systematically as a central part of this agenda. Scep-
tics have long feared an over-militarisation of climate issues; in practice, militaries 
and the wider EU security establishment remain extremely circumspect. 
A 2012 EP report found that the large number of EU documents that have given 
operational content to conflict management – including the EU Concept for Mi-
litary Planning at the Political and Strategic level, the EU Concept for Military 
Command and Control, the EU Concept for Force Generation and the EU Military 
Rapid Response Concept – are bereft of climate-related considerations (European 
Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012a: 4, 7-8). 
A number of CSDP missions have been deployed to climate-stressed areas where 
environmental factors are seen as contributing to instability. These include the ma-
ritime mission Atalanta off the Horn of Africa, and security training initiatives in 
the Sahel (especially through missions in Niger and Mali in 2012 and 2013, respec-
tively). Many policy-makers see such deployments as a harbinger of future defence 
requirements. The EU has invested heavily in a Global Monitoring for Environment 
and Security (GMES) system that is now being rolled out, with a range of satellites 
and other capacities. 
However, while such missions and support reflect an evolution in military thinking, 
they have been extremely low key and cannot be said to represent major deploy-
ments triggered primarily by climate factors. No EU military deployment has been 
countenanced to safeguard supplies coming into Europe, as one might expect in a 
hyper-realist geo-strategic scenario. Policy-makers acknowledge that progress on 
reconfiguring militaries for climate security threats has been slow and limited. 
Several analysts have suggested that climate change’s most notable impact on mili-
tary configurations will be the onus it places on defending home territories against 
extreme weather (Jermy, 2011: 148). The EU agreed an Adaptation Strategy in April 
2013 that was focused on such internal initiatives. The strategy recognises that in-
ternal adaptation measures remain at ‘an early stage’ in Europe. Fifteen member 
states have national adaptation strategies that are just beginning to engage in mea-
ningful projects. The new strategy commits the EU to better exchange of member 
states’ best practice; peer pressure to ensure all member states implement national 
strategies; and EU-wide vulnerability assessments, culminating in ‘comprehensive 
threat and risk assessment reports’ to be produced jointly by the Commission and 
High Representative in 2015 (European Commission, 2013b).
Progress has also been made on ‘military greening’. The European defence estab-
lishment has begun to shift away from fossil fuels to more sustainable sources in an 
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effort to reduce energy consumption. In June 2012 the European Defence Agency 
launched a Military Green programme of procurement to coordinate the plethora 
of member state plans in this area. 
In short, European militaries are now focused on their own own energy consump-
tion and how to run operations in climate stressed environments. European milita-
ries are more geared toward dealing with extreme weather events than they are sei-
zed of the broader climate-engendered changes to geopolitics. Militaries still think 
in terms of the ‘national-state interests’ to be defended against climate change, not 
the broader impact on human security - and not the need proactively to address the 
root causes of individuals’ rights and livelihoods. 
The EU engagement is limited in areas where climate-related, cross-border tensions 
have surfaced – for example, in the Nile basin. While the UK government has be-
gun to build climate risk factors into its scenario building for humanitarian res-
ponse planning, the broader implications for geopolitics are acknowledged to have 
fallen outside the purview of military and other strategic planners (Government 
Office for Science, 2011: 45).
There is general agreement that European defence establishments lag behind the 
US military’s engagement with climate change issues. Under the 2007 Global Cli-
mate Change Security Oversight Act, the US has initiated a far more systematic 
programme of research on the impacts of global climate change on military requi-
rements, operations, doctrine, organisation, training, material, logistics, personnel 
and facilities, and the actions needed to address such impacts. The 2010 Quadren-
nial Defence Review talks of climate change as an ‘accelerant’ of instability, and in 
general accords the issue higher profile than most European defence documents 
(US Department of Defence, 2010: 85). On homeland defence the EU also lags well 
behind the evolution in US military planning (Paskal, 2010: 45). 
There are fears that militaries have disingenuously over-reacted in an attempt to 
use the climate security agenda as a means of reinforcing their own claim to re-
sources and influence within government. While such concerns are not entirely un-
founded, there is insufficient evidence so far to sustain the claim that EU climate 
security policies have become overly militarised. In the US the military lead on 
climate security is much more striking than in Europe. The problem with armed 
forces’ engagement is rather that this has been limited to relatively narrow ques-
tions of disaster response and greening military operations. European militaries 
have inched toward broader climate-geopolitical deliberation, but so far in a more 
cautious manner. 
The Geo-Economics of Climate Change
Climate change is also now approached as a core pillar of European economic se-
curity. In some ways, this geo-economic dimension has filtered into EU policy res-
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ponses to a greater degree than have hard security aspects. However, a fundamental 
tension remains evident: freer markets are seen as necessary to get scarcer resources 
to where they are needed and to facilitate the spread of renewables; but globalisa-
tion is simultaneously seen as sustaining the economic model that lies at the very 
root of global warming. Emerging EU policy mixes support for open markets with 
government-backed commercial diplomacy. It seeks to strike a balance between 
interdependence and autarchy as the driving logic of security. 
Much of the European Commission’s rhetoric is favourable to free market policies.3 
The EU has pressed for a new list of ‘green goods’ within the WTO to be opened up 
for liberalized exchange. In December 2012 the EU finalised its first so-called ‘Green 
Free Trade Agreement’, with Singapore; this provides special trade rules for and 
lifts barriers in a range of green technologies. Including green clauses in bilateral 
FTAs has been seen as a means of circumventing paralysis within the WTO. The 
EU now aims to transfer the green trade provisions of the trade agreement with 
Singapore into other accords. 
Some diplomats claim that the freeing up of trade in renewables is the most geo-s-
trategically vital part of the climate security agenda. They have argued that the WTO 
needs to be brought into play to guard against the kind of export bans on food to 
which some governments have resorted since the droughts in 2009 and 2010. Free 
trade routes are posited as essential to a secure supply of raw materials.  A core aim 
is to keep the integrity of supply chains in tact in states affected by climate instability. 
While the EU’s rhetoric is that of positive-sum market interdependence, at least 
some European policies betray a more mercantile outlook. One leading team of 
experts detects signs of a more protectionist stance towards green trade (Overseas 
Development Institute, 2012). An autumn 2013 Citi Bank report observes a new 
‘energy Darwinism’ as competitive support for different technologies has inten-
sified (Citi Bank, 2013). Also in 2013, a Chatham House report noted the same 
trend towards resource nationalism and climate-driven protectionism in many 
countries. 
Climate change has not convinced governments to support CAP reform – the latter 
clearly worsens scarcity in developing state and so feeds instability and conflict as 
climate impacts begin to hit. From a development point of view, officials insist that 
the imperative it to restrict big companies from buying up large tracts of land in 
poor countries to grow their own food in an effort to horde resources as a preventi-
ve measure against climate change. 
The IEA complains that financial support to renewables has been unacceptably 
high in nine EU member states and is a sign of new green mercantilism (Platts, 2011: 
3  See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/environment/climate-change/
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3). The Commission has pushed to keep non-EU biofuels out of Europe though re-
gulations to do with the biodiversity of where they are grown, as concerns over the 
‘indirect’ impact of biofuels increase. France has focused increasingly on the export 
of nuclear technology that other member states judge to be a security risk (Szarka, 
2011: 117). 
There is a new focus on governments supporting companies to gain contractual 
access to scarce resources. In October 2012 the Commission presented an update 
of EU industrial policy that promised a ‘raw materials diplomacy’ to secure ac-
cess to vital supplies (European Commission, 2012a). The British government has 
launched a new ‘action plan for resource security’, which focuses in particular on 
guaranteeing access to speciality metals on the road towards low carbon (Defra-
BIS, 2012). The Energy Roadmap 2050 states that decarbonisation should be a com-
petitive boon for the EU as an ‘early mover’ in the global market for renewable 
(European Commission, 2011: 9). Government-backed commercial diplomacy has 
become more prominent as Europe has begun to lose ground in green technology 
to China and other rising powers.
The mercantile line is especially evident in the unbending EU insistence on more 
restrictive intellectual property rules in relation to low carbon technologies. A firm 
line is being maintained on IPR despite this complicating a number of free trade 
talks. 
The frequent complaint from developing countries has been that the EU is engaged 
in a quick grab for large-scale renewable projects oriented towards exporting ener-
gy to European markets rather than in a genuine partnership to maximise renewa-
bles’ potential for ‘host’ societies too. Environmental NGOs worry that European 
governments are pumping funds into large scale, export-oriented renewables pro-
jects that are likely merely to worsen local conflict dynamics. 
This is no clear EU position yet on geo-engineering. Member state governments 
express concerns over ‘rogue research’ while also funding their own explorations 
into geo-engineering solutions. 
Overall, critics charge that European governments seem not to recognise that the 
strategic need to share new technologies is more important than the profits of a 
small number of private companies (Mabey, 2009: 7). European governments often 
seem intent on protecting renewables market shares and profits to the detriment of 
an overarching geopolitical interest in disseminating new technologies. 
Building on Achievements
There is on-going debate over the best security response to climate change. Some 
analysts argue that this issue must propel governments towards deeper, positive-
sum, liberal cooperation. More than any other issue, they insist, climate security 
requires outward-looking international cooperation. Other analysts suggest that 
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climate change will drive governments towards more isolationist foreign policies 
based on self-protection. Pessimists fear that ‘lifeboat scenario’ self-help will beco-
me the dominant logic of Western security strategies. In practice, European policies 
currently hover uneasily between these two logics. In their basic approach to cli-
mate security, European governments are hedging between deeper international 
cooperation and self-reliance. 
Policy outcomes certainly do not yet appear wholesale to reflect arguments that 
the only way to guarantee security in a world ravaged by extensive warming is 
through the ‘lifeboat’ solution. There is little evidence that European governments 
are inclined towards a strongly militarised approach. The EU has inched in ad hoc 
fashion towards a balance between state security and human security logics in its 
climate geo-strategy. To date, the EU’s approach to climate security is best descri-
bed as a ‘securitzation-lite’. 
Yet, a concern is evident among diplomats that climate insecurity may challenge 
the liberal-cooperative approach in the long-term. The EU still needs to attach grea-
ter priority to deeper international cooperation in pursuit of collective security and 
qualitative change in the nature of economic growth. It needs to map out more 
sharply defined policies on these matters as part of its mainstream, day-to-day fo-
reign policies, in addition to current efforts within areas of ring-fenced ‘climate 
crisis’ management. 
The EU still needs to make the move from ‘climate security’ to a full-spectrum 
climate foreign policy. While the self-defined security community has begun to 
come to terms with the implications of global warming, efforts more broadly to 
mainstream climate within foreign policy as a whole need to be markedly inten-
sified. 
Many remain sceptical of the climate security agenda because they conflate securi-
tisation with militarisation; but the fact that the latter should be limited does not 
mean that the former is not needed. More strongly embedded international regimes 
will be required in all areas of security and crisis management. And the EU must 
still move beyond climate security being debated merely in terms of Europe having 
to defend itself against instability that originates ‘out there’ as opposed to mitiga-
ting the way its own policies often magnify global threats. 
Security will not be ensured simply by spending modestly higher amounts on 
conflict prevention, adaptation or renewables-dissemination in developing states, 
however necessary and welcome such steps are. More profound adjustment is pen-
ding on the very essence of the way in which EU foreign and security policy inte-
racts with and seeks to shape the global order. It is here that the opportunity lies for 
the EU to build upon advances made in the last decade to assume more far-sighted 
leadership on issues of global climate security.  
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